

Learning Assumptions for Compositional Verification

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Abstract. Compositional verification is a promising approach to addressing the state explosion problem associated with model checking. One compositional technique advocates proving properties of a system by checking properties of its components in an assume-guarantee style. However, the application of this technique is difficult because it involves non-trivial human input. This paper presents a novel framework for performing assume-guarantee reasoning in an incremental and fully automated fashion. To check a component against a property, our approach generates assumptions that the environment needs to satisfy for the property to hold. These assumptions are then discharged on the rest of the system. Assumptions are computed by a learning algorithm. They are initially approximate, but become gradually more precise by means of counterexamples obtained by model checking the component and its environment, alternately. This iterative process may at any stage conclude that the property is either true or false in the system. We have implemented our approach in the LTSA tool and applied it to a NASA system.

1 Introduction

Our work is motivated by an ongoing project at NASA Ames Research Center on the application of model checking to the verification of autonomous software. Autonomous software involves complex concurrent behaviors for reacting to external stimuli without human intervention. Extensive verification is a prerequisite for the deployment of missions that involve autonomy.

Given some formal description of a system and of a required property, model checking automatically determines whether the property is satisfied by the system. The limitation of the approach, referred to as the “state explosion” problem [8], is that it needs to store the explored system states in memory, which is impossible for most realistic systems.

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Compositional verification presents a promising way of addressing state explosion. It advocates a “divide and conquer” approach where properties of the system are decomposed into properties of its components, so that if each component satisfies its respective property, then so does the entire system. Components are therefore model checked separately. It is often the case, however, that components only satisfy properties in specific contexts (also called environments). This has given rise to the assume-guarantee style of reasoning [18, 21].

Assume-guarantee reasoning first checks whether a component M guarantees a property P , when it is part of a system that satisfies an assumption A . Intuitively, A characterizes all contexts in which the component is expected to operate correctly. To complete the proof, it must also be shown that the remaining components in the system, i.e., M ’s environment, satisfy A . Several frameworks have been proposed [7, 16–18, 21, 24] to support this style of reasoning. However, their practical impact has been limited because they require non-trivial human input in defining assumptions that are strong enough to eliminate false violations, but that also reflect the remaining system appropriately.

In contrast, this paper presents a novel framework for performing assume-guarantee reasoning in an *incremental* and *fully automatic* fashion. Our approach iterates a process based on gradually *learning* assumptions. The learning process is based on queries to component M and on counterexamples obtained by model checking M and its environment, alternately. Each iteration may conclude that the required property is satisfied or violated in the system analyzed. This process is guaranteed to terminate; in fact, it converges to an assumption that is necessary and sufficient for the property to hold in the specific system.

Our approach has been implemented in the Labeled Transition Systems Analyzer (LTSA) [20], and applied to the analysis of the Executive module of an experimental Mars Rover (K9) developed at NASA Ames. We are currently in the process of also implementing it in Java Pathfinder (JPF) [23]. In fact, as our approach relies on standard features of model checkers, it is fairly straightforward to add in any such tool.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first provide some background in Section 2, followed by a high level description of the framework that we propose in Section 3. The algorithms that implement this framework are presented in Section 4. We discuss the applicability of our approach in practice and extensions that we are considering in Section 5. Section 6 describes our experience with applying our approach to the Executive of the K9 Mars Rover. Finally, Section 7 presents related work and Section 8 concludes the paper.

2 Background

The presentation of our approach is based on techniques for modeling and checking concurrent programs implemented in the LTSA tool [20]. The LTSA supports Compositional Reachability Analysis (CRA) of a software system based on its architecture, which, in general, has a hierarchical structure. CRA incrementally computes and abstracts the behavior of composite components based on the




Fig. 1. Example LTSs **Fig. 2.** Order Property **Fig. 3.** LTS for *Output'*

behavior of their immediate children in the hierarchy [13]. The flexibility that the LTSA provides in selecting any component in the hierarchy for analysis or abstraction makes it ideal for experimenting with our approach.

Labeled Transition Systems (LTSs). The LTSA tool uses LTSs to model the behavior of communicating components in a concurrent system. In the following, we present LTSs and semantics of their operators in a typical process algebra style. However note that our goal here is not to define a process algebra.

Let \mathcal{Act} be the universal set of observable actions and let τ denote a local action *unobservable* to a component's environment. We use π to denote a special *error state*, which models the fact that a safety violation has occurred in the associated system. We require that the error state has no outgoing transitions. Formally, an LTS M is a four tuple $\langle Q, \alpha M, \delta, q_0 \rangle$ where:

- Q is a finite non-empty set of states
- $\alpha M \subseteq \mathcal{Act}$ is a set of observable actions called the *alphabet* of M
- $\delta \subseteq Q \times \alpha M \cup \{\tau\} \times Q$ is a transition relation
- $q_0 \in Q$ is the initial state

We use Π to denote the LTS $\langle \{\pi\}, \mathcal{Act}, \emptyset, \pi \rangle$. An LTS $M = \langle Q, \alpha M, \delta, q_0 \rangle$ is *non-deterministic* if it contains τ -transitions or if $\exists (q, a, q'), (q, a, q'') \in \delta$ such that $q' \neq q''$. Otherwise, M is *deterministic*.

Consider a simple communication channel that consists of two components whose LTSs are shown in Fig. 1. Note that the initial state of all LTSs in this paper is state 0. The *Input* LTS receives an input when the action **input** occurs, and then sends it to the *Output* LTS with action **send**. After some data is sent to it, *Output* produces output using the action **output** and acknowledges that it has finished, by using the action **ack**. At this point, both LTSs return to their initial states so the process can be repeated.

Traces. A *trace* σ of an LTS M is a sequence of observable actions that M can perform starting at its initial state. For example, $\langle \mathbf{input} \rangle$ and $\langle \mathbf{input}, \mathbf{send} \rangle$ are both traces of the *Input* LTS in Fig. 1. The set of all traces of M is called the *language* of M , denoted $\mathcal{L}(M)$. For $\Sigma \subseteq \mathcal{Act}$, we use $\sigma \upharpoonright \Sigma$ to denote the trace obtained by removing from σ all occurrences of actions $a \notin \Sigma$.

Parallel Composition. Let $M = \langle Q, \alpha M, \delta, q_0 \rangle$ and $M' = \langle Q', \alpha M', \delta', q'_0 \rangle$. We say that M *transits* into M' with action a , denoted $M \xrightarrow{a} M'$, if and only if $(q_0, a, q'_0) \in \delta$ and either $Q = Q'$, $\alpha M = \alpha M'$, and $\delta = \delta'$ for $q'_0 \neq \pi$, or, in the special case where $q'_0 = \pi$, $M' = \Pi$.

The parallel composition operator \parallel is a commutative and associative operator that combines the behavior of two components by synchronizing the actions common to their alphabets and interleaving the remaining actions. For example, in the parallel composition of the *Input* and *Output* components from Fig. 1, actions **send** and **ack** will each be synchronized.

Formally, let $M_1 = \langle Q^1, \alpha M_1, \delta^1, q_0^1 \rangle$ and $M_2 = \langle Q^2, \alpha M_2, \delta^2, q_0^2 \rangle$ be two LTSs. If $M_1 = \Pi$ or $M_2 = \Pi$, then $M_1 \parallel M_2 = \Pi$. Otherwise, $M_1 \parallel M_2$ is an LTS $M = \langle Q, \alpha M, \delta, q_0 \rangle$, where $Q = Q^1 \times Q^2$, $q_0 = (q_0^1, q_0^2)$, $\alpha M = \alpha M_1 \cup \alpha M_2$, and δ is defined as follows, where a is either an observable action or τ (note that the symmetric rules are implied by the fact that the operator is commutative):

$$\frac{M_1 \xrightarrow{a} M'_1, a \notin \alpha M_2}{M_1 \parallel M_2 \xrightarrow{a} M'_1 \parallel M_2} \quad \frac{M_1 \xrightarrow{a} M'_1, M_2 \xrightarrow{a} M'_2, a \neq \tau}{M_1 \parallel M_2 \xrightarrow{a} M'_1 \parallel M'_2}$$

Properties. We call a deterministic LTS that contains no π states a *safety LTS*. A *safety property* is specified as a safety LTS P , whose language $\mathcal{L}(P)$ defines the set of acceptable behaviors over αP . An LTS M satisfies P , denoted as $M \models P$, if and only if $\forall \sigma \in \mathcal{L}(M) : (\sigma \upharpoonright \alpha P) \in \mathcal{L}(P)$.

When checking a property P , an *error LTS* denoted P_{err} is created, which traps possible violations with the π state. Formally, the error LTS of a property $P = \langle Q, \alpha P, \delta, q_0 \rangle$ is $P_{err} = \langle Q \cup \{\pi\}, \alpha P_{err}, \delta', q_0 \rangle$, where $\alpha P_{err} = \alpha P$ and

$$\delta' = \delta \cup \{(q, a, \pi) \mid a \in \alpha P \text{ and } \nexists q' \in Q : (q, a, q') \in \delta\}$$

Note that the error LTS is *complete*, meaning each state other than the error state has outgoing transitions for every action in the alphabet.

For example, the *Order* property shown in Fig. 2 captures a desired behavior of the communication channel shown in Fig. 1. The property comprises states 0, 1 and the transitions denoted by solid arrows. It expresses the fact that **inputs** and **outputs** come in matched pairs, with the **input** always preceding the **output**. The dashed arrows illustrate the transitions to the error state that are added to the property to obtain its error LTS.

To detect violations of property P by component M , the parallel composition $M \parallel P_{err}$ is computed. It has been proved that M violates P if and only if the π state is reachable in $M \parallel P_{err}$ [5]. For example, state π is not reachable in $Input \parallel Output \parallel Order_{err}$, so we conclude that $Input \parallel Output \models Order$.

Assume-Guarantee Reasoning. In the assume-guarantee paradigm a formula is a triple $\langle A \rangle M \langle P \rangle$, where M is a component, P is a property, and A is an assumption about M 's environment [21]. The formula is true if whenever M is part of a system satisfying A , then the system must also guarantee P .

The LTSA is particularly flexible in performing assume-guarantee reasoning. Both assumptions and properties are defined as safety LTSs⁴. In fact, a safety LTS A can be used as an assumption *or* as a property. To be used as an assumption for module M , A itself is composed with M , thus playing the role of an abstraction of M 's environment. To be used as a property to be checked on M , A is turned into A_{err} and then composed with M .

To check an assume-guarantee formula $\langle A \rangle M \langle P \rangle$, where both A and P are safety LTSs, the LTSA computes $A \parallel M \parallel P_{err}$ and checks if state π is reachable in the composition. If it is, then $\langle A \rangle M \langle P \rangle$ is violated, otherwise it is satisfied.

Deterministic Finite State Automata (DFAs) and Safety LTSs. One of the components of our framework is a learning algorithm that produces DFAs, which our framework then uses as safety LTSs. A DFA M is a five tuple $\langle Q, \alpha M, \delta, q_0, F \rangle$ where $Q, \alpha M, \delta$, and q_0 are defined as for *deterministic* LTSs, and $F \subseteq Q$ is a set of accepting states.

For a DFA M and a string σ , we use $\delta(q, \sigma)$ to denote the state that M will be in after reading σ starting at state q . A string σ is said to be *accepted* by a DFA $M = \langle Q, \alpha M, \delta, q_0, F \rangle$ if $\delta(q_0, \sigma) \in F$. The *language accepted by M* , denoted $\mathcal{L}(M)$ is the set $\{\sigma \mid \delta(q_0, \sigma) \in F\}$.

The DFAs returned by the learning algorithm in our context are *complete*, *minimal*, and *prefix-closed* (an automaton M is prefix-closed if $\mathcal{L}(M)$ is prefix-closed, i.e., for every $\sigma \in \mathcal{L}(M)$, every prefix of σ is also in $\mathcal{L}(M)$). These DFAs therefore contain a single non-accepting state. They can easily be transformed into safety LTSs by removing the non-accepting state, which corresponds to state π of an error LTS, and all transitions that lead into it.

3 Framework for Incremental Compositional Verification

Consider the case where a system is made up of two components, M_1 and M_2 . As mentioned in the previous section, a formula $\langle A \rangle M \langle P \rangle$ is true if, whenever M is part of a system satisfying A , then the system must also guarantee property P . The simplest compositional proof rule shows that if $\langle A \rangle M_1 \langle P \rangle$ and $\langle true \rangle M_2 \langle A \rangle$ hold, then $\langle true \rangle M_1 \parallel M_2 \langle P \rangle$ is true. This proof strategy can also be expressed as an inference rule as follows:

$$\frac{\begin{array}{l} \text{(Step 1) } \langle A \rangle M_1 \langle P \rangle \\ \text{(Step 2) } \langle true \rangle M_2 \langle A \rangle \end{array}}{\langle true \rangle M_1 \parallel M_2 \langle P \rangle}$$

Note that this rule is not symmetric in its use of the two components, and does not support circularity. Despite its simplicity, our experience with applying compositional verification to several applications has shown it to be the most useful rule in the context of checking safety properties. For the use of the compositional rule to be justified, the assumption must be more abstract than M_2 ,

⁴ Any LTS without π states can be transformed into a safety LTS by determinization.




Fig. 4. Incremental compositional verification during iteration i

but still reflect M_2 's behavior. Additionally, an appropriate assumption for the rule needs to be strong enough for M_1 to satisfy P in Step 1. Developing such an assumption is a non-trivial process.

To obtain appropriate assumptions, our framework applies the compositional rule in an iterative fashion as illustrated in Fig. 4. At each iteration i , an assumption A_i is provided based on some knowledge about the system and on the results of the previous iteration. The two steps of the compositional rule are then applied. Step 1 is applied first, to check whether M_1 guarantees P in environments that satisfy A_i . If the result is false, it means that this assumption is too *weak*, i.e., A_i does not restrict the environment enough for P to be satisfied. The assumption therefore needs to be *strengthened* (which corresponds to removing behaviors from it) with the help of the counterexample produced by Step 1. In the context of the next assumption A_{i+1} , component M_1 should at least not exhibit the violating behavior reflected by this counterexample.

If Step 1 returns true, it means that A_i is strong enough for the property to be satisfied. To complete the proof, Step 2 must be applied to discharge A_i on M_2 . If Step 2 returns true, then the compositional rule guarantees that P holds in $M_1 \parallel M_2$. If it returns false, further analysis is required to identify whether P is indeed violated in $M_1 \parallel M_2$ or whether A_i is stronger than necessary. Such analysis is based on the counterexample returned by Step 2. If A_i is too strong it must be *weakened* (i.e., behaviors must be added) in iteration $i+1$. The result of such weakening will be that at least the behavior that the counterexample represents will be allowed by assumption A_{i+1} . The new assumption may of course be too weak, and therefore the entire process must be repeated.

To implement this iterative, incremental process in a fully automated way, our framework uses a learning algorithm for assumption generation and a model checker for the application of the two steps in the compositional rule. The learning algorithm is described in detail in the next section.

- (1) let $S = E = \{\lambda\}$
- loop {
- (2) Update T using queries
- while (S, E, T) is not closed {
- (3) Add sa to S to make S closed where $s \in S$ and $a \in \Sigma$
- (4) Update T using queries
- }
- (5) Construct candidate DFA C from (S, E, T)
- (6) Make the conjecture C
- (7) if C is correct return C
- else
- (8) Add $e \in \Sigma^*$ that witnesses the counterexample to E
- }

Fig. 5. The L* Algorithm

4 Algorithms

4.1 The L* Algorithm

The learning algorithm used by our approach was developed by Angluin [3] and later improved by Rivest and Schapire [22]. In this paper, we will refer to the *improved* version by the name of the original algorithm, L*. L* learns an unknown regular language and produces a DFA that accepts it. Let U be an unknown regular language over some alphabet Σ . In order to learn U , L* needs to interact with a *Minimally Adequate Teacher*, from now on called *Teacher*. A Teacher must be able to correctly answer two types of questions from L*. The first type is a *membership query*, consisting of a string $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$; the answer is *true* if $\sigma \in U$, and *false* otherwise. The second type of question is a *conjecture*, i.e., a candidate DFA C whose language the algorithm believes to be identical to U . The answer is *true* if $\mathcal{L}(C) = U$. Otherwise the Teacher returns a counterexample, which is a string σ in the symmetric difference of $\mathcal{L}(C)$ and U .

At a higher level, L* creates a table where it incrementally records whether strings in Σ^* belong to U . It does this by making membership queries to the Teacher. At various stages L* decides to make a conjecture. It constructs a candidate automaton C based on the information contained in the table and asks the Teacher whether the conjecture is correct. If it is, the algorithm terminates. Otherwise, L* uses the counterexample returned by the Teacher to extend the table with strings that witness differences between $\mathcal{L}(C)$ and U .

In the following more detailed presentation of the algorithm, line numbers refer to L*'s illustration in Fig. 5. L* builds an observation table (S, E, T) where S and E are a set of prefixes and suffixes, respectively, both over Σ^* . In addition, T is a function mapping $(S \cup S \cdot \Sigma) \cdot E$ to $\{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$, where the operator “ \cdot ” is defined as follows. Given two sets of event sequences P and Q , $P \cdot Q = \{pq \mid p \in P \text{ and } q \in Q\}$, where pq represents the concatenation of the event sequences p and q . Initially, L* sets S and E to $\{\lambda\}$ (line 1), where λ represents the empty

string. Subsequently, it updates the function T by making membership queries so that it has a mapping for every string in $(S \cup S \cdot \Sigma) \cdot E$ (line 2). It then checks whether the observation table is *closed*, i.e., whether

$$\forall s \in S, \forall a \in \Sigma, \exists s' \in S, \forall e \in E : T(sae) = T(s'e)$$

If (S, E, T) is not closed, then sa is added to S where $s \in S$ and $a \in \Sigma$ are the elements for which there is no $s' \in S$ (line 3). Once sa has been added to S , T needs to be updated (line 4). Lines 3 and 4 are repeated until (S, E, T) is closed.

Once the observation table is closed, a candidate DFA $C = \langle Q, \alpha C, \delta, q_0, F \rangle$ is constructed (line 5), with states $Q = S$, initial state $q_0 = \lambda$, and alphabet $\alpha C = \Sigma$, where Σ is the alphabet of the unknown language U . The set F consists of the states $s \in S$ such that $T(s) = \text{true}$. The transition relation δ is defined as $\delta(s, a) = s'$ where $\forall e \in E : T(sae) = T(s'e)$. Such an s' is guaranteed to exist when (S, E, T) is closed. The DFA C is presented as a conjecture to the Teacher (line 6). If the conjecture is correct, i.e., if $\mathcal{L}(C) = U$, L^* returns C as correct (line 7), otherwise it receives a counterexample $c \in \Sigma^*$ from the Teacher.

The counterexample c is analyzed by L^* to find a suffix e of c that witnesses a difference between $\mathcal{L}(C)$ and U ; e must be such that adding it to E will cause the next conjectured automaton to reflect this difference⁵ (line 8). Once e has been added to E , L^* iterates the entire process by looping around to line 2.

Characteristics of L^* . L^* is guaranteed to terminate with a minimal automaton M for the unknown language U . Moreover, for each closed observation table (S, E, T) , the candidate DFA C that L^* constructs is smallest, in the sense that any other DFA consistent⁶ with the function T has at least as many states as C . This characteristic of L^* makes it particularly attractive for our framework. The conjectures made by L^* strictly increase in size; each conjecture is smaller than the next one, and all incorrect conjectures are smaller than M . Therefore, if M has n states, L^* makes at most $n - 1$ incorrect conjectures. The number of membership queries made by L^* is $\mathcal{O}(kn^2 + n \log m)$, where k is the size of the alphabet of U , n is the number of states in the minimal DFA for U , and m is the length of the longest counterexample returned when a conjecture is made.

4.2 Learning for Assume-Guarantee Reasoning

Assume a system $M_1 \parallel M_2$, and a property P that needs to be satisfied in the system. In the context of the compositional rule presented in Section 3, the learning algorithm is called to guess an assumption that can be used in the rule to prove or disprove P . An assumption with which the rule is guaranteed to return conclusive results is the *weakest assumption* A_w under which M_1 satisfies P . Assumption A_w describes exactly those traces over $\Sigma = (\alpha M_1 \cup \alpha P) \cap \alpha M_2$

⁵ The procedure for finding e is beyond the scope of this paper, but is described in [22].

⁶ A DFA C is consistent with function T if, for every σ in $(S \cup S \cdot \Sigma) \cdot E$, $\sigma \in \mathcal{L}(C)$ if and only if $T(\sigma) = \text{true}$.

which, when simulated on $M_1 \parallel P_{err}$ cannot lead to state π . The language $\mathcal{L}(A_w)$ of the assumption contains at least *all* traces of M_2 abstracted to Σ that prevent M_1 from violating P . Formally, A_w is such that, for any environment component M_E , $\langle true \rangle M_1 \parallel M_E \langle P \rangle$ if and only if $\langle true \rangle M_E \langle A_w \rangle$ [14].

In our framework, L^* learns the traces of A_w through the iterative process described in Section 3. The process terminates as soon as compositional verification returns conclusive results, which is often before the weakest assumption A_w is computed by L^* . For L^* to learn A_w , we need to provide a Teacher that is able to answer the two different kinds of questions that L^* asks. Our approach uses model checking to implement such a Teacher.

Membership Queries. To answer a membership query for $\sigma = \langle a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n \rangle$ in Σ^* the Teacher simulates the query on $M_1 \parallel P$. For clarity of presentation we will reduce such simulations to model checking, although we have implemented them more efficiently, directly as simulations. So for string σ , the Teacher first builds $A_\sigma = \langle Q, \alpha A_\sigma, \delta, q_0 \rangle$ where $Q = \{q^0, q^1, \dots, q^n\}$, $\alpha A_\sigma = \Sigma$, $\delta = \{(q^i, a^{i+1}, q^{i+1}) \mid 0 \leq i < n\}$, and $q_0 = q^0$. The Teacher then model checks $\langle A_\sigma \rangle M_1 \langle P \rangle$. If true is returned, it means that $\sigma \in \mathcal{L}(A_w)$, because M_1 does not violate P in the context of σ , so the Teacher returns true. Otherwise, the answer to the membership query is false.

Conjectures. Due to the fact that in our case the language $\mathcal{L}(A_w)$ that is being learned is prefix-closed, all conjectures returned by L^* are also prefix-closed. Our framework transforms these conjectures into safety LTSs (see Section 2), which constitute the intermediate assumptions A_i . In our framework, the first priority is to guide L^* towards a conjecture that is strong enough to make Step 1 of the compositional rule return true. Once this is accomplished, the resulting conjecture may be too strong, in which case our framework guides L^* towards a conjecture that is weak enough to make Step 2 return conclusive results about whether the system satisfies P . The way the Teacher that we have implemented reflects this approach is by using two oracles and counterexample analysis to answer conjectures as follows.

Oracle 1 performs Step 1 in Fig. 4, i.e., it checks $\langle A_i \rangle M_1 \langle P \rangle$. If this does not hold, the model checker returns a counterexample c . The Teacher informs L^* that its conjecture A_i is not correct and provides $c \upharpoonright \Sigma$ to witness this fact. If, instead, $\langle A_i \rangle M_1 \langle P \rangle$ holds, the Teacher forwards A_i to Oracle 2.

Oracle 2 performs Step 2 in Fig. 4 by checking $\langle true \rangle M_2 \langle A_i \rangle$. If the result of model checking is true, the teacher returns true. Our framework then terminates the verification because, according to the compositional rule, P has been proved on $M_1 \parallel M_2$. If model checking returns a counterexample, the Teacher performs some analysis to determine the underlying reason (see Section 3 and Fig. 4).


Counterexample analysis is performed by the Teacher in a way similar to that used for answering membership queries. Let c be the counterexample returned by Oracle 2. The Teacher computes $A_{c \upharpoonright \Sigma}$ and checks $\langle A_{c \upharpoonright \Sigma} \rangle M_1 \langle P \rangle$. If true, it means that A_i is too strong since M_1 does not violate P in the context of

Table 1. Mapping T_1

		E_1
		λ
S_1	λ	true
	output	false
$S_1 \cdot \Sigma$	ack	true
	output	false
	send	true
	output, ack	false
	output, output	false
	output, send	false

Table 2. Mapping T_2

		E_2	
		λ	ack
S_2	λ	true	true
	output	false	false
	send	true	false
$S_2 \cdot \Sigma$	ack	true	true
	output	false	false
	send	true	false
	output, ack	false	false
	output, output	false	false
	output, send	false	false
	send, ack	false	false
	send, output	true	true
	send, send	true	true

**Fig. 6.** A_1 **Fig. 7.** A_2 **Fig. 8.** A_3 **Fig. 9.** A_4

c , and $c \upharpoonright \Sigma$ is returned as a counterexample for conjecture A_i . If the model checker returns false with some counterexample c' , it means that P is violated in $M_1 \parallel M_2$. To generate a counterexample for $\langle true \rangle M_1 \parallel M_2 \langle P \rangle$ our framework composes c and c' in a way similar to the parallel composition of LTSs. That is, common actions in c and c' are synchronized and some interleaving instance of the remaining actions is selected.

4.3 Example

Given components *Input* and *Output* as shown in Fig. 1 and the property *Order* shown in Fig. 2, we will check $\langle true \rangle Input \parallel Output \langle Order \rangle$ by using our approach. The alphabet of the assumptions that will be used in the compositional rule is $\Sigma = ((\alpha Input \cup \alpha Order) \cap \alpha Output) = \{\mathbf{send}, \mathbf{output}, \mathbf{ack}\}$.

As described, at each iteration L^* updates its observation table and produces a candidate assumption whenever the table becomes closed. The first closed table obtained is shown in Table 1 and its associated assumption, A_1 , is shown in Fig. 6. The Teacher answers conjecture A_1 by first invoking Oracle 1, which checks $\langle A_1 \rangle Input \langle Order \rangle$. Oracle 1 returns false, with counterexample

$\sigma = \langle \text{input}, \text{send}, \text{ack}, \text{input} \rangle$, which describes a trace in $A_1 \parallel \text{Input} \parallel \text{Order}_{err}$ that leads to state π .

The Teacher therefore returns counterexample $\sigma \upharpoonright \Sigma = \langle \text{send}, \text{ack} \rangle$ to L^* , which uses queries to update its observation table until it is closed. From this table, shown in Table 2, the assumption A_2 , shown in Fig. 7, is constructed and conjectured to the Teacher. This time, Oracle 1 reports that $\langle A_2 \rangle \text{Input} \langle \text{Order} \rangle$ is true, meaning the assumption is not too weak. The Teacher calls Oracle 2 to determine if $\langle \text{true} \rangle \text{Output} \langle A_2 \rangle$. This is also true, so our algorithm reports that $\langle \text{true} \rangle \text{Input} \parallel \text{Output} \langle \text{Order} \rangle$ holds.

This example did not involve weakening of the assumptions produced by L^* , since the assumption A_2 was sufficient for the compositional proof. This will not always be the case. For example, let us substitute *Output* by *Output'* illustrated in Fig. 3, which allows multiple **send** actions to occur before producing **output**. The verification process will be identical to the previous case, until Oracle 2 is invoked by the Teacher for conjecture A_2 . Oracle 2 returns that $\langle \text{true} \rangle \text{Output}' \langle A_2 \rangle$ is false, with counterexample $\langle \text{send}, \text{send}, \text{output} \rangle$. The Teacher analyzes this counterexample and determines that in the context of this trace, *Input* does not violate *Order*. The trace is returned to L^* , which will weaken the conjectured assumption. The process involves two more iterations, during which assumptions A_3 (Fig. 8) and A_4 (Fig. 9), are produced. Using A_4 , which is the weakest assumption A_w , both Oracles report true, so our framework reports that $\langle \text{true} \rangle \text{Input} \parallel \text{Output}' \langle \text{Order} \rangle$ holds.

5 Discussion

5.1 Correctness

Theorem 1. *Given components M_1 and M_2 , and property P , the algorithm implemented by our framework terminates and it returns true if P holds on $M_1 \parallel M_2$ and false otherwise.*

Proof. To prove the theorem we will first argue correctness of our approach, and then the fact that it terminates.

Correctness: The Teacher in our framework uses the two steps of the compositional rule to answer conjectures. It only returns true when both steps return true, and therefore correctness is guaranteed by the compositional rule. Our framework reports an error when it detects a trace σ of M_2 which, when simulated on M_1 , violates the property, which implies that $M_1 \parallel M_2$ violates P .

Termination: At any iteration, our algorithm returns true or false and terminates, or continues by providing a counterexample to L^* . By correctness of L^* , we are guaranteed that if it keeps receiving counterexamples, it will eventually, at some iteration i , produce A_w . During this iteration, Step 1 will return true by definition of A_w . The Teacher will therefore apply Step 2, which will return either true and terminate, or a counterexample. This counterexample represents a trace of M_2 that is not contained in $\mathcal{L}(A_w)$. Since, as discussed in Section 4, A_w is both necessary and sufficient, analysis of the counterexample will return false, and the algorithm will terminate. \square

5.2 Practical Considerations

In our context, the languages queried by L^* are prefix-closed. This is because our technique applies to purely safety properties; any finite prefix of a trace that satisfies such a property must also satisfy the property. Therefore, when for some string σ a membership query $\langle A_\sigma \rangle M_1 \langle P \rangle$ returns false, we know that for any extension of σ the answer will also be false. We can thus improve the efficiency of the algorithm by reducing the cost of some of the membership queries that are answered by the Teacher. For example, in the observation table shown in Table 1, the entry for $\langle \text{output} \rangle$ is false. The Teacher can return false for the queries $\langle \text{output, ack} \rangle$, $\langle \text{output, send} \rangle$, and $\langle \text{output, output} \rangle$ without invoking the model checker.

In our framework, membership queries, conjectures, and counterexample analysis all involve model checking, which is performed on-the-fly. The assumptions that are used in these steps are increasing in size, and grow no larger than the size of A_w . In our experience, for well-designed systems, the interfaces between components are small. Therefore, assumptions are expected to be significantly smaller than the environment that they represent in the compositional rules. Although L^* needs to maintain an observation table, this table does not need to be kept in memory while the model checking is performed.

Note that our framework provides an “any time” [11] approach to compositional verification. If memory is not sufficient to reach termination, intermediate assumptions are generated, which may be useful in approximating the requirements that a component places on its environment to satisfy certain properties.

5.3 Extensions

Generalization. Our approach has been presented in the context of two components. Assume now that a system consists of n components $M_1 \parallel \dots \parallel M_n$. The simplest way to generalize our approach is to group these components into two higher level components, and apply the compositional rules as already discussed. Another possibility is to handle the general case without computing the composition of any components directly. Our algorithm provides a way of checking $\langle \text{true} \rangle M_1 \parallel M_2 \langle P \rangle$ in a compositional way. If M_2 consists of more than one component, our algorithm could be applied recursively for Step 2. This is an interesting future direction, in particular since the membership queries concentrate on a single component at a time. However, we need to further investigate how meaningful such an approach would be in practice.

Computing the Weakest Assumption. L^* can also be used to learn the weakest possible assumption A_w that will prevent a component M_1 from violating a property P . This assumption will be generated without knowing M_2 , the component M_1 interacts with. The only place in our assume-guarantee framework where M_2 is used is in Oracle 2, when the Teacher tries to determine if the Assumption generated is too strong. Oracle 2 can be replaced by a conformance checker, for example the W-Method [6], which is designed to expose a

Table 3. Results for the Rover Example

Iteration	$ A_i $	States	Transitions	Result
1 - Oracle 1	1	5	24	Too weak
2 - Oracle 1	2	268	1,408	Too weak
3 - Oracle 1	3	235	1,209	Too weak
4 - Oracle 1	5	464	2,500	Not too weak
4 - Oracle 2	5	32	197	False

difference between a specification and an implementation. This will produce a set of sequences that are guaranteed to expose an error in the conjectured assumption if one exists. The sequence of intermediate assumptions conjectured by the Teacher are approximate and become more refined the longer L^* runs. As discussed before, approximate assumptions can still be useful.

6 Experience

We implemented the assume-guarantee framework described above in the LTSA tool, and experimented with our approach in the analysis of a design-level model of the executive subsystem for the K9 Mars Rover, developed at NASA Ames. The executive is a multi-threaded system that receives plans from a Planner, which it executes according to a plan language semantics.

We used our framework to check one property that refers to a subsystem of the executive consisting of two components: the main coordinating component named *Executive*, and a component responsible for monitoring state conditions named *ExecCondChecker*. The property states that for a specific variable of the *ExecCondChecker* shared with the *Executive*, if the *Executive* reads the value of the variable, then the *ExecCondChecker* should not read this value before the *Executive* clears it first. We set $M_1 = \text{ExecCondChecker}$ and $M_2 = \text{Executive}$. The experiment was conducted on a Pentium III 500 MHz with 1 Gb of memory running RedHat Linux 7.2 using Sun’s Java SDK version 1.4.0_01. To check the property directly by composing the two modules with the property required searching 3,630 states and 34,653 transitions.

Table 3 shows the results of using our framework on this example. The $|A_i|$ column gives the number of states of the assumptions generated. The table also shows the number of states and transitions explored during the analysis of the assumption. In iterations 1-3, Oracle 1 determined that the learned assumptions were too weak. In iteration 4, the learned assumption was not too weak so it was given to Oracle 2, which returned a counterexample. When simulated on the *ExecCondChecker*, this counterexample led to an error state. The analysis therefore concluded that the property does not hold.

The largest state space involved in the application of our approach was explored by Oracle 1 during iteration 4, and consisted of 464 states and 2,500 transitions. This is approximately one order of magnitude smaller than the state space explored when checking the property directly on $M_1 \parallel M_2$. On the other

hand, our approach took 8.639 seconds as compared to 0.535 seconds for checking the property directly. This is due to the iterative learning of assumptions. However, we believe that the potential benefits of our approach in terms of memory outweigh the time overhead that it may incur. Our experimental work is of course preliminary, and we are planning to carry out larger case studies to validate our approach.

7 Related Work

One way of addressing both the design and verification of large systems is to use their natural decomposition into components. Formal techniques for support of component-based design are gaining prominence, see for example [9, 10]. In order to reason formally about components in isolation, some form of assumption (either implicit or explicit) about the interaction with, or interference from, the environment has to be made. Even though we have sound and complete reasoning systems for assume-guarantee reasoning, see for example [7, 16, 18, 21, 24], it is always a mental challenge to obtain the most appropriate assumption [17].

It is even more of a challenge to find automated techniques to support this style of reasoning. The thread modular reasoning underlying the Calvin tool [12] is one start in this direction. In the framework of temporal logic, the work on Alternating-time Temporal Logic ATL [1] was proposed for the specification and verification of open systems together with automated support via symbolic model checking procedures. The Mocha toolkit [2] provides support for modular verification of components with requirement specifications based on the ATL.

In previous work [14], we presented an algorithm for automatically generating the weakest possible assumption for a component to satisfy a required property. Although the motivation of that work is different, the ability to generate the weakest assumption can also be used to automate assume-guarantee reasoning. The algorithm in [14] does not compute partial results, meaning no assumption is obtained if the computation runs out of memory. This may happen if the state space of the component is too large. The approach presented here generates assumptions incrementally and may terminate before A_w is computed. Moreover, even if it runs out of memory before reaching conclusive results, intermediate assumptions may be used to give some indication to the developer of the requirements that the component places on its environment.

The problem of generating an assumption for a component is similar to the problem of generating component interfaces to deal with intermediate state explosion in CRA. Several approaches have been defined for automatically abstracting a component's environment to obtain interfaces [4, 19]. These approaches do not address the issue of incrementally refining interfaces, as needed for carrying out an assume-guarantee proof.

Learning in the context of model checking has also been investigated in [15], but with a different goal. In that work, the L^* Algorithm is used to generate a model of a software system which can then be fed to a model checker. A conformance checker determines if the model accurately describes the system.

8 Conclusions

Although theoretical frameworks for sound and complete assume-guarantee reasoning have existed for decades, their practical impact has been limited because they involve non-trivial human interaction. In this paper, we presented a novel approach to performing such reasoning in a fully automatic fashion. Our approach uses a learning algorithm to generate and refine assumptions based on queries and counterexamples, in an iterative process. The process is guaranteed to terminate, and return true if a property holds in a system, and a counterexample otherwise. If memory is not sufficient to reach termination, intermediate assumptions are generated, which may be useful in approximating the requirements that a component places on its environment to satisfy certain properties.

One advantage of our approach is its generality. It relies on standard features of model checkers, and could therefore easily be introduced in any such tool. For example, we are currently in the process of implementing it in JPF for the analysis of Java code. The architecture of our framework is modular, so its components can easily be substituted by more efficient ones. To evaluate how useful our approach is in practice, we are planning its extensive application to real systems. However, our early experiments provide strong evidence in favor of this line of research.

In the future, we plan to investigate a number of topics including whether the learning algorithm can be made more efficient in our context; whether different algorithms would be more appropriate for generating the assumptions; whether we could benefit by querying a component and its environment at the same time or by implementing more powerful compositional rules. An interesting challenge will also be to extend the types of properties that our framework can handle to include liveness, fairness, and timed properties.

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