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ASSURE 2017 Call for Papers

Software plays a key role in high-risk systems, e.g., safety-, and security-critical systems. Several certification standards/guidelines now recommend and/or mandate the development of assurance cases for software-intensive systems, e.g., defense (UK MoD DS-0056), aviation (CAP 670, FAA's operational approval guidance for unmanned aircraft systems), automotive (ISO 26262), and healthcare (FDA infusion pumps total product lifecycle guidance). As such, there is a need to develop models, techniques and tools that target the development of assurance arguments for software.

The goals of the 2017 Workshop on Assurance Cases for Software-intensive Systems (ASSURE 2017) are to:

  • explore techniques for creating/assessing assurance cases for software-intensive systems;
  • examine the role of assurance cases in the engineering lifecycle of critical systems;
  • identify the dimensions of effective practice in the development and evaluation of assurance cases;
  • investigate the relationship between dependability techniques and assurance cases; and,
  • identify critical research challenges and define a roadmap for future development.

We solicit high-quality contributions: research, practice, tools and position papers on the application of assurance case principles and techniques to assure that the dependability properties of critical software-intensive systems have been met.

Papers should attempt to address the workshop goals in general.


Topics of interest include, but are not limited to:

  • Assurance issues in emerging paradigms, e.g., adaptive and autonomous systems, including self-driving cars, unmanned aircraft systems, complex health care and decision making systems, etc.

  • Standards: Industry guidelines and standards are increasingly requiring the development of assurance cases, e.g., the automotive standard ISO 26262 and the FDA guidance on the total product lifecycle for infusion pumps.

  • Certification and Regulations: The role and usage of assurance cases in the certification of critical systems, as well as to show compliance to regulations.

  • Empiricism: Empirical assessment of the applicability of assurance cases in different domains and certification regimes.

  • Dependable architectures: How do fault-tolerant architectures and design measures such as diversity and partitioning relate to assurance cases?

  • Dependability analysis: What are the relationships between dependability analysis techniques and the assurance case paradigm?

  • Safety and security co-engineering: What are the impacts of security on safety, particularly safety cases, and how can safety and security cases (e.g., as proposed in ISO 26262 and SAE J 3061 respectively) be reconciled?

  • Tools: Using the output from software engineering tools (testing, formal verification, code generators) as evidence in assurance cases / using tools for the modeling, analysis and management of assurance cases.

  • Application of formal techniques for the creation, analysis, reuse, and modularization of arguments.

  • Exploration of relevant techniques for assurance cases for real-time, concurrent, and distributed systems.

  • Assurance of software quality attributes, e.g., safety, security and maintainability, as well as dependability in general, including tradeoffs, and exploring notions of the quality of assurance cases themselves.

  • Domain-specific assurance issues, in domains such as aerospace, automotive, healthcare, defense and power.

  • Reuse and Modularization: Contracts and patterns for improving the reuse of assurance case structures.

  • Relations between different formalisms and paradigms of assurance and argumentation, such as Goal Structuring Notation, STAMP, IBIS, and goal-oriented formalisms such as KAOS.
View submission guidelines, and deadlines.

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